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Recently, W. H. Zurek presented a novel derivation of the Born rule based on a mechanism
termed environment-assisted invariance, or “envariance” (W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90(2),
120404 (2003)). We review this approach and identify fundamental assumptions that have implicitly
entered into it, emphasizing issues that any such derivation is likely to face.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Yz, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
In standard quantum mechanics, Born’s rule [1] is sim-
ply postulated. A typical formulation of this rule reads:
If an observable Ô, with eigenstates {|oi〉} and
spectrum {oi}, is measured on a system described
by the state vector |ψ〉, the probability for the
measurement to yield the value oi is given by
p(oi) = |〈oi|ψ〉|
2.
Born’s rule is of paramount importance to quantum
mechanics as it introduces a probability concept into the
otherwise deterministic theory and relates it mathemat-
ically to the Hilbert space formalism. No violation of
Born’s rule has ever been discovered experimentally—
which has certainly supported the roˆle of the Born rule
as the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed
the “shut up and calculate” interpretation of quantum
mechanics. (Although often attributed to Feynman, it
appears that the nickname was actually coined by David
Mermin [2]. For an example of such a stance, see [3]).
Replacing the postulate of Born’s rule by a derivation
would be a highly desirable goal within quantum theory
in general. The famous theorem of Gleason [4] presented
a mathematical motivation for the form of the Born prob-
abilities by showing that if one would like to assign a non-
negative real valued function p(v) to every vector v of a
vector space V of dimension greater than two such that
for every orthonormal basis {v1, . . . , vn} of V the sum of
the p(vi) is equal to one,∑
i
p(vi) = 1, (1)
then the only possible choice is p(v) = |〈v|w〉|2 for all vec-
tors v and an arbitrary but fixed vector w, provided that
probabilities are assumed to be non-contextual. The nor-
malization requirement of Eq. (1) for p(v) with respect
to any orthonormal basis can be physically motivated
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by remembering that any orthonormal basis {v1, . . . , vn}
can be viewed as the eigenbasis of observables Ô =∑
i λi|vi〉〈vi|, and by referring to the fact that in every
measurement of such an observable Ô on a system with
state vector w one outcome (represented by the eigen-
value λj corresponding to one of the eigenvectors vj) will
occur, such that p(vj) = 1 and p(vi) = 0 for i 6= j,
and Eq. (1) follows. In spite of its mathematical ele-
gance, Gleason’s theorem is usually considered as giving
rather little physical insight into the emergence of quan-
tum probabilities and the Born rule.
Other attempts towards a consistent derivation of the
Born probabilities have previously been made in particu-
lar in the context of relative-state interpretations where
both the meaning of probabilities and their relation to
Born’s rule requires explicit elucidation (see, for example,
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]), but the success of these approaches is
controversial [11, 12, 13]. A widely disputed derivation of
the Born rule that is solely based on the non-probabilistic
axioms of quantum mechanics and on classical decision
theory (and that is more physically motivated than Glea-
son’s argument) has been proposed by Deutsch [14]. It
was critized by Barnum et al. [15] but was subsequently
defended by Wallace [16] and put into an operational
framework by Saunders [17]; no decisive conclusion seems
to have been reached on the success of these derivations
thus far.
A novel and interesting proposal towards a derivation
of Born’s rule has recently been put forward by Zurek [18]
(see also the follow-ups in [19, 20]). Zurek is a key fig-
ure in the development of the decoherence program (for
a recent survey of the program and further references,
see [20, 21]) that is based on a study of open quantum
systems and their interaction with the many degrees of
freedom of their environment, leading to explanations for
the emergence of the “classical” world of our observation.
However, one of the remaining loopholes in a consistent
derivation of classicality from decoherence and standard
non-collapse quantum mechanics alone has been tied to
the fact that the formalism of decoherence and its in-
terpretation rely implicitely on Born’s rule, but that de-
coherence does not yield an independent motivation for
the connection between the quantum mechanical state
2space formalism and probabilities. Any derivation of the
Born rule from decoherence [22] is therefore subject to
the charge of circularity [23].
To address this criticism, Zurek has suggested a deriva-
tion of Born’s rule that is based on the inclusion of the
environment—thus matching well the spirit of the de-
coherence program—but without relying on the key ele-
ments of decoherence that presume Born’s rule and would
thus render the argument circular. Zurek’s derivation is
of course not only relevant in the context of the decoher-
ence program.
Because we consider Zurek’s approach promising, we
would like to bring out the assumptions that enter into
the derivation but have not been explicitely mentioned in
Refs. [18, 19, 20]. Hopefully such an analysis will help in a
careful evaluation of the question to what extent Zurek’s
derivation can be regarded as fundamental. In fact, after
this paper had been posted online as a preprint, two other
discussions of Zurek’s argument have appeared that also
describe variants of the proof [24, 25]. Moreover, Zurek
himself [26] has recently revised his original derivation
in a way that addresses several of the issues raised in
this article and that is more explicit about the assump-
tions (some designated now as “facts”) used in his proof.
These correspond to what we identify in the following
discussion.
To anticipate, we find that Zurek’s derivation is based
on at least the following assumptions:
(1) The probability for a particular outcome, i.e., for
the occurence of a specific value of a measured
physical quantity, is identified with the proba-
bility for the eigenstate of the measured observ-
able with eigenvalue corresponding to the measured
value—an assumption that would follow from the
eigenvalue–eigenstate link.
(2) Probabilities of a system S entangled with another
system E are a function of the local properties of S
only, which are exclusively determined by the state
vector of the composite system SE .
(3) For a composite state in the Schmidt form |ψSE〉 =∑
k λk|sk〉|ek〉, the probability for |sk〉 is equal to
the probability for |ek〉.
(4) Probabilities associated with a system S entangled
with another system E remain unchanged when cer-
tain transformations (namely, Zurek’s “envariant
transformations”) are applied that only act on E
(and similarly for S and E interchanged).
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we review
Zurek’s derivation of the Born rule as given in his original
papers [18, 19, 20], and also include a line of reasoning
presented in his recent follow-up [26] (that in turn takes
issues raised in the following discussion into account). We
then elucidate and discuss step by step the assumptions
that we believe have entered into Zurek’s approach. In
the final section, we summarize our main points.
II. REVIEW OF ZUREK’S DERIVATION
(I) Zurek suggests a derivation of Born’s rule for the
following pure state that describes an entanglement be-
tween a system S, described by a Hilbert space HS , and
its environment E , represented by a Hilbert space HE :
|ψSE〉 =
∑
k
λk|sk〉|ek〉, (2)
where {|sk〉} and {|sk〉} are orthonormal bases ofHS and
HE , respectively. Zurek holds that after the SE correla-
tion has been established, the system no longer interacts
with the environment [19, p. 10], i.e., that E is “dynam-
ically decoupled” [18, p. 120404-1] and thus “causally
disconnected” [20, p. 754] from S.
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we shall in the
following restrict ourselves to the case of coefficients of
equal magnitude and to two-dimensional state spaces HS
and HE , i.e., we consider the state
|ψSE〉 = 1√
2
(
eiα1 |s1〉|e1〉+ eiα2 |s2〉|e2〉
)
. (3)
Once a valid derivation of Born’s rule is accomplished for
this situation, the case of non-equal probabilities and of
state spaces of more than two dimensions can be treated
by means of a relatively straightforward counting argu-
ment [18] (at least for probabilities that are rational num-
bers). What Zurek’s derivation now aims to establish is
the result that for an observer of S, the probabilities for
|s1〉 and |s2〉 will be equal. That claim is the focus of our
analysis.
(II) Zurek considers pairs of unitary transformations
ÛS = ûS ⊗ ÎE and ÛE = ÎS ⊗ ûE . Here ûS acts only on
the Hilbert state space HS of S, and ÎE is the identity
operator in HE . Similarly ûE acts only on the Hilbert
state space HE of E , and ÎS is the identity operator in
HS .
If the composite state |ψSE〉 is invariant under the com-
bined application of ÛS and ÛE ,
ÛE(ÛS |ψSE〉) = |ψSE〉, (4)
the composite state is called envariant under ûS . (The
word “envariant” stems from the abbreviation “envari-
ance” of the term “environment-assisted invariance”, an
expression coined by Zurek). Zurek gives the following
interpretation of envariance [18, p. 120404-1]:
When the transformed property of the system
can be so “untransformed” by acting only on the
environment, it is not the property of S . Hence,
when SE is in the state |ψSE〉 with this charac-
teristic, it follows that the envariant properties of
S must be completely unknown.
It is difficult to understand just what the term “prop-
erty” refers to here, since it is the composite state that is
transformed and untransformed, and so the “properties”
involved would seem to be features of the state, not of
3the system. It seems that envariance under ûS is taken to
imply that an observer who “in the spirit of decoherence”
[19, p. 10] only has access to S will not be able to deter-
mine features of the combined state that are affected by
ûS (or, more properly, by ÛS). For such an observer a lo-
cal description of S will be independent of these features,
which may depend on a particular decomposition. While
this general description is far from precise, the uses to
which Zurek puts envariance are clear enough.
(IIa) The first type of an envariant transformation
that Zurek considers is the pair
û
(β1,β2)
S = e
iβ1 |s1〉〈s1|+ eiβ2 |s2〉〈s2|, (5a)
û
(β1,β2)
E = e
−iβ1 |e1〉〈e1|+ e−iβ2 |e2〉〈e2|. (5b)
The effect of the first transformation ÛS = û
(β1,β2)
S ⊗ ÎE
is to change the phases associated with the terms in the
Schmidt state, Eq. (3), that is,
ÛS |ψSE〉 = 1√
2
(
ei(α1+β1)|s1〉|e1〉+ ei(α2+β2)|s2〉|e2〉
)
.
(6)
It is easy to see that if one subsequently acts on this
state with ÛE = ÎS ⊗ û(β1,β2)E , the original |ψSE〉 will
be restored. Thus, |ψSE〉, and in particular the phases
associated with the states in the Schmidt decomposition
of |ψSE〉, are envariant under the phase transformation
û
(β1,β2)
S given by Eq. (5a).
In the spirit of Zurek’s interpretation of envariance
stated above, this implies that the phases of the Schmidt
coefficients are not a property of S alone, so that a local
description of S cannot depend on the phases α1 and α2
in the composite state |ψSE〉 of Eq. (3). This leads Zurek
to the conclusion that also the probabilities associated
with S must be independent of these phases, and that it
thus suffices to show that equal likelihoods arise for the
state
|ψSE〉 = 1√
2
(
|s1〉|e1〉+ |s2〉|e2〉
)
. (7)
We shall therefore use this state in the rest of the argu-
ment.
(IIb) Another type of envariant transformations rel-
evant to Zurek’s derivation are so-called “swaps”,
û
(1↔2)
S = |s1〉〈s2|+ |s2〉〈s1|, (8a)
û
(1↔2)
E = |e1〉〈e2|+ |e2〉〈e1|. (8b)
Application of ÛS = û
(1↔2)
S ⊗ ÎE , with û(1↔2)S from
Eq. (8a), to the state |ψSE〉 in Eq. (7) yields
ÛS |ψSE〉 = 1√
2
(
|s2〉|e1〉+ |s1〉|e2〉
)
, (9)
i.e., the states of the environment E correlated with the
states of the system S have been interchanged. This
swap can obviously be undone by a “counterswap” ÛE =
ÎS ⊗ û(1↔2)E , with û(1↔2)E from Eq. (8b), applied to the
state ÛS |ψSE〉 in Eq. (9). Thus, the composite state
|ψSE〉, Eq. (7), is envariant under swaps. The invariant
property is then “|sk〉 is correlated with |el〉”. On the ba-
sis of the interpretation of envariance quoted above, this
implies that a local description of S must be independent
of which particular environmental state |el〉 is correlated
with a given |sk〉, i.e., that swapping of the states of the
system cannot be detected by a local observation of S
alone.
(IIIa) To make the connection between envariance
of |ψSE〉 under swaps with quantum probabilities and
Born’s rule, Zurek states [18, p. 120404-2]:
Let us now make a rather general (and a bit
pedantic) assumption about the measuring pro-
cess: When the states are swapped, the cor-
responding probabilities get relabeled (i ↔ j).
This leads us to conclude that the probabilities
for any two envariantly swappable |sk〉 are equal.
This argument assumes that the swapping transfor-
mation (that interchanges the correlations between the
states of the system and the environment) also swaps the
probabilities associated with the states of the system.
To motivate this assumption, the following line of rea-
soning has been described to us by Zurek in private com-
munication and has subsequently also appeared in pub-
lished form in Refs. [24, 26]. Let p(|s1〉; |ψSE〉) denote
the probability for |s1〉 when the SE combination is in
the composite state |ψSE〉, and similarly for |s2〉, |e1〉
and |e2〉. Before the first swap, Zurek states that
p(|s1〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; |ψSE〉),
p(|s2〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; |ψSE〉), (10)
by referring to the direct connection between the states
of S and E in the state vector expansion Eq. (3). After
the first swap (acting on S),
p(|s1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; ÛS |ψSE〉),
p(|s2〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉),
(11)
where we have used ÛS |ψSE〉 instead of |ψSE〉 as the sec-
ond argument of the probability function to take into ac-
count the transformation of the state of SE . Zurek now
holds that under a swap, properties of the environment
cannot have been affected by the first swap acting on the
system S only, so that we must have
p(|e1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; |ψSE〉),
p(|e2〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; |ψSE〉).
(12)
After the application of the counterswap, we get
p(|s1〉; ÛEÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉),
p(|s2〉; ÛEÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉),
(13)
where Zurek has that
p(|s1〉; ÛEÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|s1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉),
p(|s2〉; ÛEÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|s2〉; ÛS |ψSE〉),
(14)
4since the counterswap only acted on E . Moreover, since
after the counterswap the final state vector will be iden-
tical to the initial state vector, Zurek concludes that
p(|s1〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|s1〉; |ψSE〉),
p(|s2〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|s2〉; |ψSE〉),
p(|e1〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; |ψSE〉),
p(|e2〉; ÛE ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; |ψSE〉).
(15)
This implies, from the above Eqs. (10)–(15), that
p(|s1〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|s1〉; ÛEÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|s1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉)
= p(|e2〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|s2〉; |ψSE〉), (16)
which establishes the desired result p(|s1〉; |ψSE〉) =
p(|s2〉; |ψSE〉).
(IIIb) Since the connection between envariance un-
der swaps and equal probabilities is the crucial step in
the derivation, we would like to mention another line of
argument found in Zurek’s papers [19, 20] that more ex-
plicitely connects envariance with ignorance and the in-
formation available to a local observer. Here, Zurek con-
siders a von Neumann measurement carried out on the
composite state vector |ψSE〉 by an observer, described
by “memory states” |µ0〉 (the premeasurement mem-
ory state) and |µ1〉, |µ2〉 (the post-measurement memory
states corresponding to the perception of the “outcomes”
|s1〉 and |s2〉, respectively):
|µ0〉|ψSE〉 ∝ |µ0〉
(|s1〉|e1〉+ |s2〉|e2〉)
−→ |µ1〉|s1〉|e1〉+ |µ2〉|s2〉|e2〉. (17)
Zurek then states [20, p. 755]:
[Envariance of |ψSE〉 under swaps] allows the
observer (who knows the joint state of SE ex-
actly) to conclude that the probabilities of all
the envariantly swappable outcomes must be the
same. The observer cannot predict his mem-
ory state after the measurement of S because he
knows too much: the exact combined state of SE.
(. . . ) Probabilities refer to the guess the observer
makes on the basis of his information before the
measurement about the state of his memory—the
future outcome—after the measurement. Since
the left-hand side of Eq. (17) is envariant under
swaps of the system states, the probabilities of
all the states must be equal.
In a different paper, Zurek argues [19, p. 12]:
When the state of the observer’s memory is not
correlated with the system, and the absolute val-
ues of the coefficients in the Schmidt decompo-
sition of the entangled state describing SE are
all equal, and E cannot be accessed, the result-
ing state of S is objectively invariant under all
local measure-preserving transformations. Thus,
with no need for further excuses, probabilities of
events {|sk〉} must be—prior to measurement—
equal.
Obviously, these arguments appeal to a rather different
explanation for the emergence of equal likelihoods from
the envariance of |ψSE〉 under swaps than the previously
quoted argument. Now, probabilities are introduced from
the point of view of the observer to account for his lack of
knowledge of the individual state of S, since he has per-
fect knowledge of the composite state of SE . Then, so
goes Zurek’s claim, since the observer cannot detect the
swapping of the possible outcome states |s1〉 and |s2〉 of S
before the measurement, he will regard them as “equiv-
alent” and therefore attach equal likelihoods to them.
III. DISCUSSION
(A) First of all, Zurek’s derivation intrinsically re-
quires the split of the total Hilbert space H into at least
two subspaces HS and HE which are identified with a
system S and its environment E , where S is presumed
to have interacted with E at some point in the past.
The environment is then responsible for the emergence
of probabilities within the system, similar to the spirit
of decoherence where the environment is responsible for
the emergence of subjective classicality within the system
[20, 21].
The obvious question is then to what extent the ne-
cessity to include the environment constitutes a restric-
tion of generality. Apart from the problem of how to
do cosmology, we might take a pragmatic point of view
here by stating that any observation of the events to
which we wish to assign probabilities will always require
a measurement-like context that involves an open system
interacting with an external observer, and that therefore
the inability of Zurek’s approach to derive probabilities
for a closed, undivided system should not be considered
as a shortcoming of the derivation.
(B) Secondly, we might wonder whether the choice of
the entangled pure Schmidt state, Eq. (2), implies a lack
of generality in the derivation. Any two-system compos-
ite pure state state can be diagonalized in the Schmidt
form above, so the particular form of the expansion of
|ψSE〉 implies no loss of generality. Furthermore, if ρSE
were non-pure, it could be made pure simply by enlarg-
ing the space HE , which cannot influence probabilities of
S since E is assumed to be dynamically decoupled from
S after the initial interaction that established the entan-
glement between S and E [19]. We thus conclude that
once the requirement for openness is acknowledged, the
consideration of the state |ψSE〉, Eq. (2), will suffice for
a general derivation of the Born rule.
(C) Before introducing any probability concept into
quantum theory, we need to define what these proba-
bilities are supposed to be assigned to. Clearly, from
the point of view of observations and measurements, we
would like to assign probabilities to the occurence of the
specific values of the observable O that has been mea-
sured, i.e., to the “outcomes”. The eigenvalue–eigenstate
link of quantum mechanics postulates that a system has
5a value for an observable if and only if the state of the
system is an eigenstate characteristic of that value (or
a proper mixture of those eigenstates). If we consider
only a measurement situation, one way of getting this
link is first to assume that the only possible values are
outcomes of measurements and that those are restricted
to the eigenvalues oi of an operator Ô that represents the
measured observable O. If one then assumes the collapse
or projection postulate, that after the measurement the
state of the system will be in an eigenstate |oi〉 of Ô, it
follows that in the non-degenerate case (i.e., when a cer-
tain eigenvalue corresponds only to a single eigenvector
of the operator observable) an outcome oi (the value of
a physical quantity that appears in a measurement) can
be directly related to the eigenstate |oi〉 of the measured
operator Ô, as the eigenvalue–eigenstate link requires,
and we can talk equivalently about the probability for a
certain outcome, or eigenvalue or eigenstate.
The basis states {|s1〉, |s2〉} and {|e1〉, |e2〉} appearing
in the composite Schmidt state |ψSE〉 of Eq. (3) may then
be thought of as the eigenstates of operator observables
ÔS and ÔE . In this sense, Zurek’s derivation tries to es-
tablish that for the state |ψSE〉 of Eq. (3), the outcomes
represented by the eigenvalues s1 and s2 corresponding
to the eigenstates |s1〉 and |s2〉 of an operator observable
ÔS = s1|s1〉〈s1| + s2|s2〉〈s2| are equally likely. However,
in the context of the relative-state view that Zurek pro-
motes, he never explicitely talks about observables and
instead directly speaks of determining the “probabilities
of events {|sk〉}” [19, p. 12]. This identifies the proba-
bility for the occurence of a specific value of a measured
physical quantity with the probability for an eigenstate
of the measured observable with an eigenvalue equal to
the measured value. That assumption would be justified
by the eigenvalue–eigenstate link, although it does not
require it.
(D) Zurek furthermore assumes that the probabili-
ties of the outcomes associated with the individual states
{|s1〉, |s2〉} of S and {|e1〉, |e2〉} of E are functions of the
composite state vector |ψSE〉 only. (Zurek spells out the
assumption that the derivation will be based on the com-
posite state vector but without direct reference to prob-
abilities: “Given the state of the combined SE expressed
in the Schmidt form (. . . ) what sort of invariant quantum
facts can be known about S?” [18, p. 120404-1].) This
assumption about the functional dependence of the prob-
abilities is certainly reasonable, especially since Zurek’s
aim is clearly to derive Born’s rule from within standard
quantum mechanics, where the state vector is assumed
to provide a complete description of the physical system.
The assumption, of course, might well be questioned in
a hidden variable or modal interpretation.
But Zurek’s argument requires actually a more detailed
assumption than stated so far. Obviously, since the SE
composition is in an entangled pure state, there is no in-
dividual state vector of S alone. But Zurek infers the
properties of S from the composite state vector |ψSE〉 by
studying its properties under envariant transformations.
The idea is to use envariance to deduce statements about
S alone. The assumption is now that probabilities are lo-
cal in the sense that the probabilities that an observer of
S alone can associate with the “events” |sk〉—following
Zurek’s identification of outcomes with eigenstates, cf.
our discussion in (C)—only depend on the local proper-
ties of S (i.e., those properties that cannot be affected
by envariant transformations). An analogous assumption
must also be invoked with respect to E for Zurek’s argu-
ment to go through: probabilities for the states |ek〉 of E
are only dependent on the local properties of E . This is
used to infer the crucial conclusion that probabilities of
S and E must be independent of the envariant properties
of SE (i.e., properties of SE that do not belong to S or
E individually).
This locality of probabilities can be related to the de-
composition of the total Hilbert space into the state space
of the system and the state space of the environment,
together with the focus of any observation on the sys-
tem alone, on which also the whole definition of envari-
ance relies. But without having explicitely connected the
Hilbert state space description with the functional de-
pendence of the probabilities on the state, affirming that
probabilities of S and E can only depend on the local
properties of S and E , respectively, must be counted as
an important additional assumption.
(E) We would also like to point out that Zurek holds
that his argument does not require a causality or locality
assumption, but that reference to envariance suffices (see,
for example, [18, p. 120404-2]). Zurek suggests that one
could alternatively argue for the independence of proba-
bilities from an envariant property of the entangled SE
combination directly if causality and the impossibility of
faster-than-light signaling is assumed. He claims that
a measurable property associated with S cannot depend
on an envariant property of the entangled SE state, since
otherwise one could influence measurable properties of S
by acting on a “distant” environment E , and superlumi-
nal communication would be possible. We do not find
this argument compelling, since influencing measurable
properties of a system entangled with a distant partner
by locally acting on the partner does not necessarily re-
quire the effect to be instantaneously transmitted to the
system. Even if it were, it is not clear that this would en-
tail any violation of relativistic no-signaling requirements
(witness the Bohm theory!).
Of course, even if the assumption of causality and the
impossibility of faster-than-light signaling indeed justi-
fied the conclusion that envariant properties of SE can-
not influence locally measurable physical quantities of
S, any necessity for an appeal to causality to justify
Eq. (12) would be rather undesired, since the goal is to
derive the Born rule from quantum theory alone which,
strictly speaking, does not entail the impossibility of su-
perluminal communication. Zurek is clearly aware of
this point by stating that causality is “more potent” [20,
p. 754] and “more ‘costly’ (and not entirely quantum)”
[18, p. 120404-2] than envariance. He consequently holds
6that his derivation only requires envariance, although he
sometimes seems to implicitely refer to causality, for in-
stance in arguing that “only the absolute values of the
coefficients can matter since phases [of the coefficients]
can be altered by acting on E alone, and E is causally
disconnected from S” [19, p. 10].
(F) Let us now turn to the chain of relations between
the probabilities as established in Eqs. (10)–(16).
(F1) The first relations, Eqs. (10), infer equal proba-
bilities for the outcomes represented by |s1〉 and |e1〉 from
their correlation in the direct product |s1〉|e1〉 as appear-
ing in the composite state vector |ψSE〉 in the Schmidt
decomposition, Eq. (7). From a point of view that pre-
supposes Born’s rule, this assumption is of course trivially
fulfilled, since a simple projection yields
| 〈e1|〈s1|s1〉|e1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ 〈e2|〈s1|s1〉|e1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
|2
= | 〈e1|〈s1|s1〉|e1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ 〈e1|〈s2|s1〉|e1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
|2, (18)
due to orthonormality of the Schmidt basis states
{|s1〉, |s2〉} and {|e1〉, |e2〉}. But without this (obviously
undesired) presupposition, the relations in Eqs. (10) rep-
resent an additional assumption about the connection be-
tween state and probabilities which does not follow from
the assumption (D) that probabilities are a function of
the state vector only.
Of course Eqs. (10) may seem innocuous because most
of us are accustomed to thinking in terms of state space
projections, and we make an intuitive connection to prob-
abilities from such projections. But it seems important in
evaluating a derivation of the quantum probability con-
cept and Born’s rule to be aware of where such presup-
posed conceptions enter, as assumptions, into the deriva-
tion.
(F2) Yet another important assumption appears to
be contained in Eqs. (12). We recall that Zurek justi-
fied the relations p(|e1〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|e1〉; |ψSE〉) and
p(|e2〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|e2〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) by saying that the
probabilities associated with the environment E cannot
change as a result of the envariant swap acting on S since
this swap cannot affect properties of E . An analogous
statement is made in justifying the relations of Eqs. (14).
But this argument requires the assumption that the
probabilities behave similar to the envariant property
that the transformation refers to; i.e., , that the behav-
ior of probabilities under envariant transformations, in
particular swaps, is somehow known. This knowledge,
however, is not established by Zurek’s derivation, and
we do not see how it could automatically follow from
envariance (as suggested by Zurek). To illustrate this
point, consider the following two statements regarding
the implications derived from envariance in the course of
Zurek’s argument:
(i) Phase envariance implies that the probabilities of S
must be independent of the phases of the Schmidt
coefficients.
(ii) Envariance under swaps implies that the probabil-
ities of S cannot be influenced by a swap acting on
E alone.
The important difference between (i) and (ii) is that
(i) aims at demonstrating the independence of the prob-
abilities from an envariant property, whereas (ii) claims
invariance of the probabilities under an envariant trans-
formation. Statement (i) only requires assumption (D)
to hold: phase envariance implies that a local description
of S cannot depend on the phase factors of the Schmidt
coefficients, so if we assume that the probabilities are a
function of the local properties ascribed to S on the ba-
sis of the entangled state vector only (and a study of its
envariant transformations), (i) follows. But (ii) requires
more: Employing a reasoning analogous to (i), envari-
ance of the composite state under swaps solely means
that probabilities of S will not depend on whether |s1〉 is
entangled with |e1〉 or with |e2〉, since this “property” of
a specific correlation is not property of S alone; but we
have said nothing about whether the application of the
swap operation itself to E might disturb the probabilities
associated with S.
We might reinforce this concern by drawing attention
to the physical interpretation of the swap operation. A
swap applied to S implies that the existing correlations
|s1〉|e1〉 and |s2〉|e2〉 between the system S and the envi-
ronment E need to be “undone”, and new correlations of
the form |s1〉|e2〉 and |s2〉|e1〉 between S and E have to
be created. From the form of the swap transformations,
ÛS = ûS⊗ ÎE and ÛE = ÎS⊗ ûE , it is clear that swaps can
be induced by local interactions. But we do not see why
shifting features of E , that is, doing something to the en-
vironment, should not alter the “guess” (to use Zurek’s
expression [20, p. 755]; cf. the quote in (IIIb) above) an
observer of S would make concerning S-outcomes. Here,
if possible, one would like to see some further argument
(or motivation) for why the probabilities of one system
should be immune to swaps among the basis states of the
other system.
(G) Let us finally discuss Zurek’s alternative argu-
ment based on the ignorance of an observer of S with
respect to the individual state of the system S.
In his derivation, Zurek takes the entangled Schmidt
state |ψSE〉 describing the correlation between S and E
as the given starting point and assumes that the ob-
server somehow knows this state exactly already before
any measurement has taken place. According to Zurek
this knowledge seems to imply that the observer is aware
of the “menu” of possible outcomes (but cannot attribute
a particular outcome state to S before the measurement).
But since the observer has only access to S, how is this
knowledge established in the first place?
In the case of the composite state |ψSE〉 with coeffi-
cients of equal magnitude, Eq. (3), one can choose any
other orthonormal basis for HS and always find a cor-
responding orthonormal basis of HE such that the com-
posite state |ψSE〉 has again the diagonal Schmidt form
of Eq. (3). Therefore, no preferred basis of HS or HE
7has been singled out. On one hand, this implies that
Zurek’s argument does not require any a priori knowl-
edge of the environmental states |ek〉 for the observer of
S. On the other hand, however, this also means that
there is nothing that would tell the observer of S which
possible “events” |sk〉 he is dealing with. (Decoherence
provides a mechanism, termed environment-induced su-
perselection, in which the interaction of S with E singles
out a preferred basis in HS [20]; however, a fundamental
derivation of the Born rule must of course be indepen-
dent of decoherence to avoid circularity of the argument.)
Even if one holds that a choice of a particular set of ba-
sis vectors is irrelevant to the derivation since the aim is
solely to demonstrate the emergence of equal likelihoods
for any orthonormal basis {|sk〉}, one is still left with the
question how the observer of S establishes the knowledge
that the composite state must be described by coefficients
of equal magnitude.
Zurek then goes on to claim that (i) because all possi-
ble outcome states |sk〉 are envariantly swappable, these
states appear as “equivalent” to the observer of S, and
(ii) that this “equivalence of outcomes” translates into
an attribution of equal likelihoods for each of these out-
comes. With respect to part (i) of the argument, perfect
knowledge of the pure composite state implies that the
observer (before the measurement) cannot know the indi-
vidual state of S, which adds in an ignorance-based prob-
ability concept, but without having established equal
likelihoods. Now, as mentioned before, envariance un-
der swaps simply means that the question of which |el〉
of E is correlated with a particular |sk〉 of S is irrelevant
to a complete local description of S. But we do not see
how this state of affairs forces the observer of S to con-
clude that all the |sk〉 are “equivalent”. For part (ii),
we note that even if the previous argument did establish
an “equivalence of outcomes”, this epistemic indifference
about the occurrence of a particular outcome among a
set of possible outcomes would not necessarily, from a
general point of view of probability theory, force out the
implication of equal likelihoods; this conclusion would
be particularly questionable when dealing with a set of
continuous cardinality.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize, we have pointed out four important
assumptions in Zurek’s derivation about the connection
between the state vector and probabilities, and about the
behavior of probabilities under envariant transformations
of the state vector:
(1) The probability for a particular outcome in a mea-
surement is directly identified with the probability
for an eigenstate of the measured observable with
an eigenvalue equal to the value of the measured
physical quantity, an assumption that would follow
from the eigenvalue–eigenstate link.
(2) For two entangled systems S and E described by the
Schmidt state |ψSE〉 =
∑
k λk|sk〉|ek〉, probabilities
associated with the “outcome states” |sk〉 and |ek〉
of each individual system are a function of the local
properties of the systems only; these properties are
exclusively determined by the state vector |ψSE〉 of
the composite system.
(3) In an entangled Schmidt state of the form |ψSE〉 =∑
k λk|sk〉|ek〉, the “outcome states” |sk〉 and |ek〉
are equally likely: p(|sk〉; |ψSE〉) = p(|ek〉; |ψSE〉).
(4) Probabilities associated with the Schmidt states
|sk〉 of a system S entangled with another system
E remain unchanged under the application of an
envariant transformation ÛE = ÎS ⊗ ûE that only
acts on E (and similarly for S and E symmetrically
exchanged): p(|sk〉; ÛE |ψSE〉) = p(|sk〉; |ψSE〉) and
p(|sk〉; ÛS |ψSE〉) = p(|ek〉; |ψSE〉).
The necessity for an assumption like (3) in the deriva-
tion of the Born rule can be traced back to a fundamental
statement about any probabilistic theory: We cannot de-
rive probabilities from a theory that does not already con-
tain some probabilistic concept; at some stage, we need
to “put probabilities in to get probabilities out”. Our
analysis suggests that this has been done via assumption
(3) above.
We have pointed out that assumption (4) is necessary
to have the argument that is contained in the chain of
relations in Eqs. (10)–(16) between transformed and un-
transformed probabilities go through, but we claim that
this assumption neither follows from envariance alone nor
from assumption (2). We have also questioned whether
this assumption is physically plausible.
Furthermore we have expressed doubts that Zurek’s al-
ternative approach that appeals to the information avail-
able to a local observer is capable of leading to a deriva-
tion of the Born rule. It is neither clear to us how exact
knowledge of the composite state is established “within”
the local observer before the measurement, nor how en-
variance under swaps leads the observer to conclude that
the possible outcomes must be equally likely.
We hope the questions we raise here will not down-
play the interest of Zurek’s derivation in the mind of the
reader. To the contrary, because we regard it as sig-
nificant, we aimed at facilitating a balanced and careful
evaluation of Zurek’s approach by bringing out central as-
sumptions implicit in his derivation. We note that Zurek
uses both “derivation” and “motivation” to describe his
treatment of the emergence of the Born rule. Once the
critical assumptions are made explicit, however, as they
are here and now in his [26], the former term seems
more appropriate. Moreover, any derivation of quantum
probabilities and Born’s rule will require some set of as-
sumptions that put probabilities into the theory. In the
era of the “Copenhagen hegemony”, to use Jim Cush-
ing’s apt phrase, probabilities were put in by positing
an “uncontrollable disturbance” between object and ap-
paratus leading to a brute quantum “individuality” that
8was taken not to be capable of further analysis. Cer-
tainly Zurek’s approach improves our understanding of
the probabilistic character of quantum theory over that
sort of proposal by at least one quantum leap.
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